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CASE NOTE
PUBLIC LANDS-The Inclusion of Gravel in a Mineral Reservation to the
United States under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act. Western Nuclear,
Inc. v. Andrus, 475 F. Supp. 654 (1979); 664 F.2d 234 (1981), cert.
granted sub nom., Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 50 U.S.L.W. 3934
(U.S. May 24, 1982) (No. 81-1686).

In 1975 Western Nuclear, Inc. acquired ranch land on
which was located on old gravel pit. The land was subject to
a 1929 patent, issued pursuant to the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916 (SRHA). 1 In accordance with the provisions of that Act, the patent contained the following reservation:
Excepting and reserving, however, to the United
States all the coal and other minerals in the lands
so entered and patented, together with the right
to prospect for, mine, and remove the same pursuant to the provisions and limitations of the Act
of December 29, 1916.2
Western Nuclear began to remove the gravel and to use it
for road surfacing, concrete aggregate and the like. Soon
thereafter, the Wyoming Office of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) cited Western Nuclear for trespass on the
mineral interests retained by the United States. After a
hearing, the BLM assessed damages against Western Nuclear
of $13,000, which was the value of the gravel removed.' This
decision was upheld by the Interior Board of Land Appeals
(IBLA).
The United States Court for the District of Wyoming
affirmed the IBLA decision holding that gravel is a mineral
reserved to the United States by the 1929 patent.5 On appeal
to the Tenth Circuit, Western Nuclear argued that the graCopyright ) 1983 by the University of Wyoming.

1. 43 U.S.C. § 291-301 (1976), suspended by The Taylor Grazing Act of June

28, 1934, ch. 865, 48 Stat. 1269, codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 310-316(o) (1976),

2.
3.
4.
5.

repealed by the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-579, § 702, 90 Stat. 2787, codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (Supp. II
1978). Valid existing patents such as the one in this case were unaffected
by the repeal.
Western Nuclear, Inc. v. Andrus, 664 F.2d 234, 235 (10th Cir. 1981)
(emphasis added).
Id. at 235-36.
85 Interior Dec. 129 (1978).
Western Nuclear, Inc. v. Andrus, 475 F. Supp. 654 (D. Wyo. 1979).
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vel was not reserved to the United States. Alternatively, if
the court found that the gravel was reserved, Western Nuclear alleged that the BLM lacked jurisdiction over the subject land. The court held that the BLM did have authority
to cite Western Nuclear for the alleged trespass on mineral
interests retained by the United States.' The Tenth Circuit,
however, reversed the lower court and held that gravel was
not a mineral within the meaning of the mineral reservation
of the SRHA.7 The government then appealed to the United
States Supreme Court, which recently granted certiorari.'
HISTORY

In construing a federal statute, the court may consider
the intent of Congress at the time of the statute's enactment
and the circumstances then present.' This legislative intent
can be found in the stated purpose of the statute, the history
of the legislation as recorded in the legislative records, and
through examination of the condition of the country at the
time the statute was enacted.1" Therefore, a history of the
SRHA will be beneficial.
In following its own policy of encouraging the settlement and development of the western lands, Congress enacted the Homestead Act of 1862 which allowed any person
twenty-one years of age or older to enter and farm 160 acres
of land." Mineral lands were reserved from sale by the General Mining Law of 1872.12 Land was mineral in character
if it was more valuable for its minerals than for any other
purpose." To classify a land as mineral, the Interior Depart6. 664 F.2d at 238.
7. Id. at 242.
8. Western Nuclear, Inc. v Watt, 664 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. granted,
50 U.S.L.W. 3934 (May 24, 1982) (No. 81-1686).
9. Moore v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 709 (1972); United States v.
Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 69 (1940).
10. Winona & St. Peter R.R. Co. v. Barney, 113 US. 618, 625 (1885); United
States v. Union Pacific R.R., 230 F.2d 690, 692 (10th Cir. 1956), rev. on
other grounds, 353 U.S. 112 (1957).
11. 43 U.S.C. § 161-263 (1970), repealed by the Public Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, § 702, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2787 codified at
43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (Supp. 11 1978).
12. 30 U.S.C. § 21-54 (1976).
13. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526 (1902); H. P. Bennett,
Jr. 3 Pub. Lands Dec. 116 (1884); W. H. Hooper 1 Pub. Lands Dec. 560
(1881).
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ment relied on earlier administration determinations, affidavits of the entrymen themselves and information from the
field offices. This method of classification along with the
problems of distance and communication, allowed much abuse
and fraud within the system. Consequently, vast tracts of
public lands rich in minerals passed into private ownership. 4
President Theodore Roosevelt was concerned with this
problem and in the early 1900's he began to withdraw large
areas of public land, which were presumably valuable for
coal, from all forms of entry.15 In 1906 and again in 1907,
President Roosevelt encouraged Congress to conserve supplies
of mineral fuels and suggested that some public lands could
be beneficially used for production of subsurface fuels, as
well as for agriculture."6 He recommended "enactment of
such legislation as would provide title to and development of
the surface land as separate and distinct from the right to
the underlying mineral fuels in regions where these may occur."' 1 In 1909 the Secretary of the Interior emphasized the
same theme, arguing that such a scheme could prevent moextortion and fraud in the disposition of coal, oil and
nopoly,
s
gas.
Thereafter, Congress passed several acts which allowed
the
sale of land with the express reservation to the United
for
States of certain specified minerals. Patents issued under
the Coal Land Acts of 1909 and 1910 contained reservations
of coal to the United States."9 Patents issued under the Agriculture Entry Act of 1914 reserved specifically phosphate,
nitrate, potash, oil, gas and asphaltic materials to the United
States, but all rights to any other minerals subsequently
passed to the patentee."0 This Act also increased the amount
of land to be homesteaded to 320 acres.- There were still,
14. Reeves, Geraud & Moran, Development of Federally Reserved Minerals in
Fee Lands, in 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 3.1 (R.M.M.L.F. ed. 1960).
15.

Swenson, Legal Aspects of Mineral Resources Exploitation, in GATES, HisTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 726-27

(1968).

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

41 CONG. REc. 2806 (1907).
Id. (emphasis added).
1909 DEP'T INT. ANN. REP. pt. I, at 7.
30 U.S.C. § 81-90 (1976).
30 U.S.C. § 121-123 (1970).

21.

GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 503
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however, many problems. Three-hundred and twenty acres
of land in the semi-arid West were not enough for a homesteader to make a successful living, and many valuable minerals were still passing into private ownership.22
The Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 191623 appeared
to be an answer. Rather than classifying lands entered as
agricultural or mineral, the Act simply provided for a patent
which reserved to the United States all minerals in the
homesteaded land:
[A]ll entries made and patents issued under the
provisions of this subchapter shall be subject to and
contain a reservation to the United States of all the
coal and other minerals in the lands ....[and such]
deposits . . . shall be subject to disposal by the

United States in accordance with the provisions of
the coal and mineral land laws. .. 4

Congress increased the amount of land to be homesteaded to
640 acres, showing its intent to restore the grazing capacity
and the meat producing capacity of the lands in the West
and thus to promote permanent settlement. 25 At the same
time, Congress intended to reserve to the government the
ownership and right to dispose of all underlying minerals. 6
MEANING OF "MINERAL"

IN THE

MINERAL RESERVATION OF THE SRHA

"[M]ineral" is a word of general language, and not
per se a term of art. It does not have a definite
meaning. It is used in many senses. It is not capable of a definition of universal application, but is
susceptible to limitation or expansion according to
the intention with which it is used in the particular
instrument or statute.27
The general mineral reservation was not readily accepted by all Congressmen. Although Congressman Mondell
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 516-17.
43 U.S.C. § 291-301 (1976).
43 U.S.C. § 299 (1976) (emphasis added).
H.R.REP. No. 626, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1914).
H.R.REP. No. 35, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 18 (1916).
Bumpus v. United States, 325 F.2d 264, 266 (10th Cir. 1963).
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from Wyoming voted for the Act, he stated for the record
his opposition to such a broad reservation: "When one takes
into consideration the wide range of substances classed as
mineral, the actual ownership under a complete mineral
reservation becomes a doubtful question."2 Committee reports and floor debates indicate only that Congress intended
to reserve all minerals." The only discussion concerning the
scope of the mineral reservation occurred when Congressman Ferris of Oklahoma, manager of the bill, was asked
whether the reservation would include oil. He responded
that the reservation would cover "every
affirmatively, saying
30
mineral.
of
kind
Lindley on Mines, a contemporary authority on mining
law and minerals, developed certain rules for determining
whether a substance is a mineral. 1 A mineral is a substance
that (a) is recognized as a mineral according to its chemical
composition by standard authorities on the subject, or (b)
is classified as a mineral product in trade or commerce, or
(c) possesses economic value for use in trade.3 2 Lindley emphasized, however, that the real test in determining whether
a substance is a mineral is market based. If the substance is
valuable in itself and near enough to a market to have value,
it is a mineral.3
Ricketts on Mines, another standard authority, defined
"mineral" as a naturally occurring inorganic substance which
has a definite chemical formula and certain distinguishing
properties and which is capable of "being got from the earth
for the purpose of profit.""4 This definition of mineral closely
resembles that of a modern day geologist. 5
In general, the courts have not developed any firm definition of "mineral." Their decisions are often unreconcilable
28.
29.
30.
31.

54 CONG. REC. 687 (1916).
H.R.REP. No. 35, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1916) ; 53 CONG. REC. 1171 (1916).
53 CONG. REC. 1171 (1916).
LINDLEY ON MINES § 98 (rev. ed. 1914).

32. Id.
33. LINDLEY, supra note 31, at § 90.
34. RICKETTS ON MINES § 99 (1911).
35. "A naturally formed chemical element or compound having a definite chemical composition and, usually, a characteristic crystal form. A mineral is
generally considered to be inorganic.... ." AMERICAN GEOLOGICAL INSTITUTE,
GLOSSARY OF GEOLOGY 455 (1972).
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because of differences not only in the basic facts of the
cases but also in the principles applied." The Supreme Court
in 1903 considered the meaning of "mineral" in Northern
Pacific Railway v. Soderberg.T In this case, the Court held
that lands chiefly valuable for granite quarries were mineral lands." The Court noted that since the word "mineral"
is used in so many different ways, ordinary definitions are
not much of a guide in any given case. Instead, the Court
looked to Land Department rulings which supported the
theory that mineral lands are those lands which are mainly
valuable for something other than agriculture purposes."9
Noting that "nothing passes by implication," the Court emphasized that grants from the sovereign will receive a strict
construction in favor of the government.4
Only two federal court of appeals cases have construed
the meaning of the mineral reservation clause of the SRHA.
In 1931, the Tenth Circuit decided Skeen v. Lynch." That
case involved a patent issued under the SRHA. The court
held that the intent of Congress was to separate the surface
estate from the mineral estate, reserving "all of the latter to
the United States."42 More specifically, the court held that
oil and gas were within the scope of the mineral reservation.
The second case, United States v. Union Oil Co." was a
much more recent case decided by the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals. The issue in Union Oil was whether geothermal
steam was included within the mineral reservation required
by the SRHA. The court admitted that Congress in 1916
had no intention of reserving or passing title to geothermal
resources, but held that the mineral reservation clause could
.36.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See Reeves, The Meaning of the Word "Mineral," 54 N.D.L.REv. 419 (1978).
This article discusses the various factors upon which courts have relied
in determining whether a particular substance is a mineral within the
meaning of an instrument or statute.
188 U.S. 526 (1903).
Id. at 536.
Id. at 534.
Id.
48 F.2d 1044 (10th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 633 (1931).
Id. at 1046.
Id. at 1047.
549 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1977).
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still be construed to include geothermal steam." After a
discussion of the legislative history, the court concluded
that the purposes of the Act were to provide homesteaders
with enough land to support their famiiles by raising livestock and "to reserve unrelated subsurface resources, particularly energy sources, for separate disposition.""0 The
court found that in order to serve the latter purpose, a broad
construction of the mineral reservation was necessary. Since
geothermal resources contribute nothing to the agricultural
development of the surface estate and since they are depletable subsurface energy resources, much like coal and oil, the
court held that geothermal steam would be included within
the scope of the mineral reservation.4"
GRAVEL

Black's Law Dictionary defines gravel as "small stones
or fragments of stone often intermixed with particles of
sand."48 The American Geological Institute considers gravel
to be a certain size (between 1/12 to 3 inches in diameter)
of unconsolidated rock fragments."0 By Lindley's marketability test, gravel could easily be considered a mineral. By
Rickett's scientific definition, gravel is not a mineral, because it does not have a definite chemical composition.
When construing private grants or reservations of minerals, state courts have generally held that gravel is not a
mineral unless there was a specific intent to reserve the
gravel.5" This is not necessarily the rule applied to mineral
reservations by the federal government when public land is
conveyed. Since the reservations are in accordance with the
provisions of a federal statute, special statutory construction
rules must be applied and the court must ascertain the intent
of Congress. 5 '
45. Id. at 1273-74.
46. Id. at 1279.

47. Id.
48.
49.
50.
51.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 830 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
AMERICAN GEOLOGICAL INSTITUTE, 8upra note 35, at 310.
See 95 A.L.R.2d 865 (1964).
See supra notes 9 and 10.
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One state court case, State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Trujillo" decided the issue of whether gravel was
included in the mineral reservation clause of a patent issued
under the SRHA. The New Mexico Supreme Court interpreted Skeen as holding that Congress intended to separate
the land into two estates, a surface estate and a subsurface
or mineral estate. 3 The court stated in Trujillo that Congress did not intend the entryman to have use of only the
surface." If this were so, he would possess nothing more
than grass. Instead, the intent was only to reserve the minerals in the land to the United States.5 The court then held
that since ordinary gravel is just rock with no rare or exceptional character, it was not reserved to the government under the SRHA.5 8
The Tenth Circuit in Bumpus v. United States57 had
the opportunity to decide whether gravel was included in a
mineral reservation which evolved from a condemnation of
some land. In order to bulid a reservoir, the government
took the surface estate, but reserved to the owner all "oil,
gas and other minerals in and under said land.""5 Applying
the rule of construction ejusdem generis, "of the same kind
or species,"5 the court held that the terms "oil" and "gas"
limited the scope of the word "minerals" to those minerals of
the same kind or species as oil or gas. 0 Thus, gravel was not
included within the mineral reservation. 1
In construing a statute, the courts may also look to a
contemporaneous interpretation of the statute by an officer
or agency charged with its administration. 2 Several Department of the Interior decisions have addressed the issue
52. 82 N.M. 694, 487 P.2d 122 (1971).
53. 487 P.2d at 125.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 124.
325 F.2d 264 (10th Cir. 1963).
Id. at 265.

59. "Where an enumeration of specific things is followed by a more general
word or phrase, such general word or phrase is held to refer to things of
the same kind, or things that fall within the classification of specific
terms." Id. at 267.

60. Id.

61. Id.
62. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965), reh'g. denied, 380 U.S. 989 (1965).
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under consideration. Zimmerman v. Brunson," decided in
1910, was the Interior Department decision in force when
the SRHA was enacted. The Department held that land containing deposits of sand and gravel, suitable for mixing with
cement for concrete construction, was not mineral land within the meaning of the mining laws."4 The Secretary stated in
Zimmerman that sand and gravel were not recognized by
standard authorities as minerals when their sole use was
for "general building purposes" and their chief
value stem' s
city."
or
town
a
to
"proximity
med from their
Nineteen years after Zimmerman, and thirteen years
after the enactment of SRHA, the Land Department overruled itself and held in Layman v. Ellis"s that land containing valuable deposits of gravel was mineral in nature. More
recently, the Department, through a decision by the Interior
Board of Land Appeals (IBLA), upheld the Layman decision
in United States v. Isbell Construction Co."1 One issue in
Isbell was whether common sand and gravel were minerals
reserved to the United States in a patent granted under the
Taylor Grazing Act. s" The Board noted that, until 1955,
valuable deposits of sand and gravel had been considered
mineral under the mining laws. In 1955, Congress amended
the Materials Act of 194760 by the Common Varieties Act,7"
which stated in part that common varieties of sand and
gravel were not to be deemed valuable mineral deposits within the meaning of the mining laws." The Board quoted from
a Solicitor's Opinion which stated that the change in the
mining law did not affect the scope of the mineral reserva63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

39 Pub. Lands Dec. 310 (1910).
Id. at 313.
Id.
52 Pub. Lands Dec. 714 (1929).
78 Interior Dec. 385 (1971).
43 U.S.C. § 315 (1970). The Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 ended homesteading on the public domain, but authorized exchanges of land between the
government and the landowner in order to consolidate federal lands. The
landowner received a patent reserving all minerals to the United States.
43 U.S.C. § 315(g) (c) (1970).
69. Act of July 31, 1947, 61 Stat. 681. The Materials Act gave the Secretary
of the Interior the authority to dispose of mineral materials, including, but
not limited to, common varieties of sand, stone, gravel, pumice, pumicite,
cinders and clay on public lands.
70. 30 U.S.C. §§ 601-615 (1976).
71. 30 U.S.C. § 611 (1976).
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tion in the SRHA1 2 The Board then held that valuable deposits of sand and gravel were minerals reserved to the
United States.7"
THE PRINCIPAL CASE: Western Nuclear v. Andrus
In Western Nuclear, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the Wyoming district court, which had found that
gravel was a mineral reserved to the United States under
the provisions of the SRHA.74 Relying on the legislative
history of the Act, Lindley's marketability test,7" and two
Court of Appeals cases, Skeen v. Lynch and United States
v. Union Oil, the trial court concluded that once a substance
is found to be valuable, it will be included in the general
mineral reservation to the government: "This is despite the
fact that at the time of enactment of the Act the term 'mineral' may not have included these particular substances....
[T]he mineral reservation in the SRHA of 1916 is broad
enough to include gravel ...""
The Tenth Circuit overturned the district court's decision."' In doing so, the court relied on Zimmerman v. Brunson, the Interior Department decision in force when the
SRHA was enacted, which held that gravel was not a mineral for the purposes of mining laws or homestead acts.7" Just
a few years after Zimmerman, the Department of the Interior
had begun drafting the legislation which became the SRHA.
The court felt that it was "highly improbable" that the De9
partment was unaware of its own ruling in Zimmerman."
The court presumed that Congress was also aware of that
decision."0 Even though Layman v. Ellis overruled Zimmerman, the court stated that this was insignificant.8" The im72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

78 Interior Dec. at 389-90 (quoting SOLIC. Op., M-36417 of Feb. 15, 1957).
78 Interior Dec. at 390.
475 F. Supp. at 663 (D. Wyo. 1979), rev'd, 664 F.2d at 242 (10th Cir. 1981).
LINDLEY, 8upra note 31, at § 93.
475 F. Supp. at 662-63.
664 F.2d at 242.
39 Interior Dec. at 313.
664 F.2d at 240.
Id.

81. Id.
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portant thing to the court was that in 1916 the Department
of the Interior had ruled that gravel was not a "mineral.""2
The court then noted three previous cases in which other
courts had construed the reservation of "coal and other minerals" in the SRHA. The Tenth Circuit in Skeen v. Lynch
held that oil and gas were included within the reservation
clause. In United States v. Union Oil, the Ninth Circuit held
that since geothermal steam was an "unrelated subsurface
energy resource," it fell within the reservation clause. The
Western Nuclear court agreed with the analysis in Skeen
and Union Oil, but it refused to apply that type of analysis
to gravel since gravel was not a subsurface energy resource."
In the third case, State ex rel., State Highway Commission v. Trujillo, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that
gravel was not included in the mineral reservation clause
of the SRHA.8 ' The Tenth Circuit noted that the Trujillo
court disagreed with the statement in Skeen that the congressional intent of the SRHA was to grant a surface estate
and reserve to the United States the subsurface mineral
estate.8 5 The Western Nuclear court felt that this disagreement was not essential to the final result reached in
es
Trujillo.
The court in Western Nuclear also discussed two cases
that did not involve patents issued under the SRHA but did
address the issue of whether gravel was included in reservations of "other minerals." The court noted its earlier holding in Bumpus v. United States 7 that gravel was not con82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
664 F.2d at 241.
82 N.M. 694, 487 P.2d 122 (1971).
664 F.2d at 241.
Id. The Trujillo court misinterpreted Skeen to hold that by enacting the
SRHA Congress intended to grant to the entryman only the surface estate.
Skeen, however, held that the Congress intended to separate the surface
estate from the mineral estate reserving all of the latter to the United
States. 48 F.2d at 1046. In other words, the entryman was to own everything except the minerals. Therefore, the Trujillo court's disagreement
with Skeen was not important to the issue of whether gravel was a reserved
mineral.
87. This case was cited mainly because the court finds it interesting that the
government in Bumpus took a position contrary to its position in the present case. The government had claimed that gravel was not included within
the reservation phrase "oil, gas and other minerals."
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tained in the reservation clause "oil, gas and other minerals."
The second case the Western Nuclear court discussed was
State Land Board v. State Department of Fish and Game,88
a Utah Supreme Court case that held gravel was included
in a reservation to the state of "all coal and other minerals."
Both the Bumpus court and the Utah court applied the construction rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind)."
The court in Western Nuclear then employed the analy0
sis used by the Utah Supreme Court in State Land Board."
According to the Utah court, "coal and other minerals"
should be construed to mean "something of the same general
character as coal or minerals which are usually . . . more
valuable than the land in which they are contained. . . .""

The Tenth Circuit in Western Nuclear concluded that since
gravel is closely related to the surface estate, it is a "part
and parcel" of that estate.9" Gravel, the court noted, is just
"fragmented rock" and ordinary rocks and stones are not
minerals reserved to the United States in the SRHA of
1916."' The court stated that if such common substances
were considered to be reserved minerals, patentees would
own only dirt and little or nothing more.94 Therefore, the
court held that gravel was not a reserved mineral. 5
ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION

As of 1972, over seventy million acres of land have been
entered under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916." 6
Approximately twelve percent of the land in Wyoming is
subject to federal reservation of minerals, most under the
SRHA.97 Therefore, the decision in Western Nuclear directly
88. 17 Utah 2d 237, 408 P.2d 707 (1965).
89. Bumpus v. United States, 325 F.2d at 267 (10th Cir. 1963) ; State Land Bd.
v. State Dep't of Fish and Game, 408 P.2d at 708 (1965).
90. 17 Utah 2d 237, 408 P.2d at 707.
91. Western Nuclear, Inc. v. Andrus, 664 F.2d at 242 (quoting State Land Bd. v.
State Dep't of Fish and Game, 408 P.2d at 708).
92. 664 F.2d at 242.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Western Nuclear, Inc. v. Andrus, 475 F. Supp. at 658 (D. Wyo. 1979)
(citing BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T. OF INTERIOR, PUBLIC
LAND STATISTICS 58 (1972)).

97. Western Nuclear, Inc. v. Andrus, 574 F.Supp. at 658.
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affects a substantial amount of privately owned land in our
state.
In Western Nuclear the district court and the Tenth
Circuit both acknowledged that rules of statutory construction must be followed. Both courts noted that federal statutes are construed according to the congressional intent,
found in the legislative history, and the statute's historical
context."8 In Skeen v. Lynch, the Tenth Circuit had already
held the intent of Congress in the SRHA was to separate the
surface estate and the mineral estate reserving all of the
latter to the United States."9 Since this was of no help in resolving the specific issue, both courts examined the historical
setting and paid particular attention to Zimmerman v. Brunson, the Interior Department ruling that gravel was not a
mineral.
Although Zimmerman was important because it was the
decision in force at the time the SRHA was enacted, the
Tenth Circuit failed to acknowledge other important factors
which framed the "historical setting." Lindley, a leading
authority on mining law in the early 1900's, stated the test
followed by most courts in determining whether a substance
was a mineral was the profit marketability test. 0 Lindley
criticized the Land Department's decision in Zimmerman as
When the Land Departnot following this general rule.'
ment in Layman v. Ellis overruled Zimmerman, it stated
that the earlier case had, on "unsubstantial grounds," disregarded precedent set by the Department and there was no
logical reason why a discrimination should exist between
gravel and other stones which could be "extracted, removed
and marketed at a profit.' 0. 2 The district court relied on
Layman to support its position, while the Tenth Circuit totally disregarded the decision since Layman was not in force
at the time the SIRHA was enacted. Yet, Layman was an
official admission of the mistake made in Zimmerman. How98. 664 F.2d at 239; 475 F. Supp. at 656.
99. 48 F.2d at 1046.
100.

LINDLEY,

supra note 31, at § 93.

101. Id. at § 98.
102. 52 Pub. Lands Dec. at 721.
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ever, the Tenth Circuit should not be criticized too severely
for ignoring Layman. It is well-established that unless
Congress expressly states otherwise, a court may presume
the legislature intended the statutory terms to retain those
meanings previously established by the courts."' The judicially established meaning of the word "mineral" did not include gravel at the time the SRHA was enacted"' or at the
time the patent in Western Nuclear was issued.
To construe the reservation clause of the SRHA, the
district court had also applied the rules of statutory construction that public legislation is to be construed broadly
in favor of the government and that no rights pass by implication.' 5 The Tenth Circuit had previously noted in Bumpus
v. United States that if the word "mineral" is construed
broadly, gravel would be considered a mineral.'
In Western
Nuclear, the Tenth Circuit needlessly ignored these rules of
construction and their application in Bumpus. Recognizing
an exception to these rules, the Supreme Court in Leo Sheep
Co. v. United States said that public grants are not to be
construed so strictly as to "defeat the intent of the legislature, or to withhold what is given either expressly or by
necessary or fair implication."' 07 By strictly construing the
grant to the entryman in Western Nuclear as not including
gravel, the court would not only have defeated the legislative
intent, but it would have withheld what was given by necessary implication. Congress intended to give the entryman
everything except the minerals which were reserved to the
United States.0 8 Since much of the soil in the West consists
of gravel, a necessary implication is that gravel is part of
the surface estate.'" 9 Otherwise, as the Tenth Circuit noted,
the entryman would own nothing but dirt."'
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Coder v. Arts, 213 U.S. 223, 243 (1909).
Zimmerman v. Brunson, 39 Pub. Lands Dec. 310 (1910).
475 F. Supp. at 662.
325 F.2d at 266.
440 U.S. 668, 682-83 (1979).
Skeen v. Lynch, 48 F.2d 1044 (10th Cir. 1931), cert .denied, 284 U.S. 633
(1931).
109. Western Nuclear, Inc. v.Andrus, 664 F.2d at 242 (10th Cir. 1981).
110. Id.
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In Skeen the Tenth Circuit refused to apply the rule of
ejusdem generis (of the same kind of species), when it held
that oil and gas were included in a reservation of "coal and
other minerals" to the United States under the SRHA."'
However, in Western Nuclear the same court appeared to
use the rule by comparing gravel to those minerals which
were previously held to be included within the reservation:
oil and gas"' and geothermal steam. 1 ' The court also applied the Utah Supreme Court's analysis in State Land Board
v. State Department of Fish and Game in which the rule of
ejusdm generis was used to find that gravel was not a mineral." 4 The rule is of no use in construing the meaning of
"other minerals." Gravel is "like" coal, gas, oil and geothermal steam in that all of these substances have value.
The district court in Western Nuclear noted this when it
held that gravel was a mineral."' However, gravel is not
"like" coal, gas, oil and geothermal steam in that it is not an
energy resource. The Tenth Circuit used the latter analysis
to hold that gravel was not a mineral."' If courts applied
the rule of ejusdem generis to construe the mineral reservation clause of the SRHA, their results could easily be inconsistent depending on the type of comparison each court would
make.
In Western Nuclear, both the district court and the
Tenth Circuit court discussed the Ninth Circuit's decision
in United States v. Union Oil Co. The court in that case
reasoned that even though geothermal steam was not considered valuable in 1916, it had become a valuable resource
and, therefore, fell within the mineral reservation of the
SRHA."' 7 The district court applied that same analysis to
gravel." ' In 1916, gravel deposits in the West were not
considered valuable resources. Although gravel had been
used for building and construction purposes for hundreds
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

48 F.2d at 1046-47.
664 F.2d at 240.
Id. at 241.
17 Utah 2d 237, 408 P.2d 707.
475 F.Supp. at 662.
664 F.2d at 242.
549 F.2d at 1273-79.
Western Nuclear, Inc. v. Andrus, 475 F.Supp. at 662-63 (D. Wyo. 1979).
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of years, its value depended on its location. As population
increased, some of those areas containing gravel became
more valuable; under a profit marketability test, the land
could conceivably be considered mineral in character. The
district court concluded gravel was a mineral included in
the reservation since it had become valuable.11 This is too
broad a reading of Union Oil. If soil were found to be "valuable," it would be included in the reservation and the landowner would find that his patent entitled him to nothing
more than the prairie grass. Landowners have sold "moss
rock," common rock on which moss has grown, to contractors
to decorate fireplaces and homes. The rock has become "valuable," but it is absurd to think that this common rock
should now be included in a mineral reservation to the
government.
On the other hand, the Tenth Circuit in Western Nuclear
engaged in too narrow a reading of Union Oil. The Western
Nuclear court thought the Ninth Circuit had held that a
substance is reserved under the mineral reservation only if
it is a "subsurface energy resource."' 0 Since gravel is not
necessarily a subsurface resource or an energy resource, the
court distinguished the two cases. The court's narrow interpretation of Union Oil makes no sense. According to the
court's rationale, precious substances like gold and silver,
which are not energy resources, would not be included in
the mineral reservation. That is certainly not what Congress
intended.
Union Oil dealt with new substances, or new uses for
substances, and should be read with that in mind. The case
broadened the scope of the mineral reservation in the SRHA
to include new substances which are found to be valuable.
Since new energy resources are, of course, valuable, they
must be considered reserved minerals. Clearly, gravel does
not fit into that category. It is not a new substance nor has
there been any new use assigned to it.
119. Id.
120. 664 F.2d at 241.
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In its final analysis, the court in Western Nuclear
seemed to base its decision on a geologist's viewpoint of
gravel rather than a judicial viewpoint. The court's logic
was as follows. Ordinary rocks and stones are not minerals
under the reservation in the SRHA. Gravel is just fragmented rock. Therefore, gravel is not a mineral reserved
to the United States. 12 ' The court suggested that if ordinary

materials such as rock and stone were included within the
mineral reservation, many of the patentees under the SRHA
would own only dirt and little or nothing more. 122 This last

point is important and deserves more discussion than a
sentence at the end of the court's analysis. The Tenth Circuit realized that there was much more to consider than the
legislative history. 12 Much of the terrain in the Rocky
1 24
If
Mountain region is composed of rocks, sand and gravel.

sand and gravel were reserved to the government in a patent,
the entryman would not be left with much-just dirt and
grass. Records of the House debates before enactment of
the SRHA show that Congress intended to convey "fee titles"
to the patentees. These "fee titles" were to give the owner
"much more than the surface; they [were to] give him all
except the body of the reserved mineral.' 12 The purpose of
the Act was to give each settler a home with sufficient acreage to support his family.'26 Congress could not have intended to reserve those substances that comprise the soil.
Clearly, entrymen would not have settled that land if they
knew that the government could claim most of it.
The Supreme Court has consistently been concerned with
protecting the rights of landowners. As noted earlier, the
Court in Leo Sheep indicated that it would not construe a
public grant so strictly against the grantees as to defeat the
intent of the legislature or withhold what is given by neces121. Id. at 242.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 239. Construing a statute by looking to the legislative history is not
usually very helpful. The Western Nuclear dispute is one instance in which
courts have looked at the same history and setting for the SRHA and still
different results were reached.
124. 664 F.2d at 242.
125. 53 CONG. REC. 1233-34 (1916).
126. 43 U.S.C. § 292 (1976).
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Much of the land patented under

the SRHA consists of gravel. The necessary implication is
that gravel must belong to the surface estate.
From 1916 to 1975 the government made no claim to
ownership of the gravel on SRHA land.' 28 Since the SRHA

was first enacted, entrymen and their successors have treated
the gravel as part of their surface estates. The Supreme
Court in Leo Sheep stated that there is a special need for
certainty and predictability where land titles are concerned:
"[G]enerations of land patents have issued without any express reservation of right now claimed by the Government.
Nor has a similar right been asserted before.12

The Su-

preme Court should, in light of Leo Sheep, affirm the Tenth
Circuit Court's holding that gravel is not a mineral reserved
to the United States under the SRHA.
CONCLUSION

The meaning and scope of "mineral" in the mineral
reservation under the SRHA cannot be stated in precise
terms. Some substances are obviously included: coal, gold and
silver. Other substances have been judicially included: oil,
gas and geothermal steam. Some substances obviously should
not be included: common rocks and stones, and dirt.
In construing the phrase "coal and other minerals," the
court considered several factors. The court viewed the legislative intent, the historical context of the statute and other
judicial interpretations of the statute, before it correctly held
that gravel was not included in the reservation of "other
minerals."
However, the court's analysis is weak. The court in
Western Nuclear restricts the meaning of the word "min127. 440 U.S. at 682-83.

128. Reply Brief for Appellant at 4, Western Nuclear, Inc. v. Andrus, 664 F.2d
234 (10th Cir." 1981).
129. 440 U.S. at 687. The issue in Leo Sheep was whether Congress intended to
reserve an easement across public lands granted to the Union Pacific
Railroad in the Union Pacific Act of 1862. The Tenth Circuit held that an
easement was implicitly reserved. The Supreme Court reversed the decision.

440 U.S. at 679.
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eral" in the reservation clause of the SRHA. By applying
the rule of ejusdem generis and a too narrow reading of
Union Oil, the court implied that a substance is a mineral
only if it is an energy resource. This definition of "mineral"
would exclude many valuable substances like gold and silver,
which Congress certainly intended to reserve.
The Western Nuclear court should have relied more on
the Congressional intent of the SRHA and the expectations
of the landowner and the federal government. By enacting
the SRHA, Congress intended to give the entryman much
more than soil and grass. His estate included everything
except the mineral estate, which was reserved to the United
States. Since the soil consisted mostly of gravel, gravel
must necessarily be part of the surface estate.
Finally, the government did not claim ownership of the
gravel under SRHA mineral reservations until 1975, almost
sixty years after enactment of the SRHA. In view of this
and its own prior decision in Leo Sheep, the Supreme Court
should affirm the Tenth Circuit ruling.
JENNIFER L. HAGER
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